Towards a context- and social-norm-sensitive theory of morality

Why do some disapproved acts seem more moral when they are widespread, while rare acts of goodness often appear especially praiseworthy? Existing theories of moral judgment emphasize either intrinsic features of actions (e.g., harm, cooperation) or the stable values of judges (e.g., moral foundations), yet they lack a formal account of how judgments are shaped by the normative contexts in which behaviors occur. We introduce Contextual Normative Morality Theory (CNMT), which proposes that moral judgments emerge from the interaction of perceived descriptive norms (commonness) and injunctive norms (approval). Across five studies and one supplemental study with nationally representative U.S. samples (total N = 2,562), we show that this injunctive by descriptive interaction robustly predicts moral evaluations. Disapproved behaviors were judged less harshly when common, whereas approved behaviors were judged more moral when rare. These effects replicated across naturalistic behaviors, held when directly manipulating norms around the same act, extended to fictional and participant-generated behaviors, and predicted not only moral judgments but also perceptions of harmfulness and cooperativeness. Moreover, models predicting moral judgment that included the injunctive by descriptive interaction alongside perceptions of harmfulness, cooperativeness, and moral values showed better fit than models relying on harm, cooperation, or values alone. Together, these findings highlight the neglected role of normative context, advancing a more flexible, socially embedded theory of morality.