A New Toy: Will the Establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court Weaken Investment Protection?

Abstract The European Union plans to establish a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) as spart of its ongoing reforms of investment law, aimed at strengthening states’ and EU regulatory power at the expense of investment protection. A MIC will be a plurilateral rather than a multilateral endeavour, confined to a group of like-minded states (and the EU itself), at least in the foreseeable future. This article attempts to answer the question whether the establishment of a MIC will really contribute to strengthening states vis-à-vis investors. To answer this question, I compare MIC with other international courts (Court of Justice of the EU, European Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice). I then analyse the MIC institutional-procedural framework. Finally, I theorise on strategic behaviour and incentives of MIC adjudicators. All these considerations show that MIC may rather become an instrument of strengthening investment protection than its weakening.