Abstract The European Union plans to establish a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) as spart of its ongoing reforms of investment law, aimed at strengthening states’ and EU regulatory power at the expense of investment protection. A MIC will be a plurilateral rather than a multilateral endeavour, confined to a group of like-minded states (and the EU itself), at least in the foreseeable future. This article attempts to answer the question whether the establishment of a MIC will really contribute to strengthening states vis-à-vis investors. To answer this question, I compare MIC with other international courts (Court of Justice of the EU, European Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice). I then analyse the MIC institutional-procedural framework. Finally, I theorise on strategic behaviour and incentives of MIC adjudicators. All these considerations show that MIC may rather become an instrument of strengthening investment protection than its weakening.
Paweł Marcisz (Mon,) studied this question.