This paper explores a comparative analysis between the financial and economic policies of the U.S. and the Weimar Republic during the late 1920s and early 1930s, examining how Weimar Germany’s democracy collapsed during economic downturns while the U.S. system emerged stronger. It explores several Weimar and U.S. leaders and governmental actions with support from archival research. It argues that major anti-democratic sentiment failed to develop and penetrate deeply into American civil society in comparison with the Weimar Republic throughout the comparable economic and financial crises in Weimar Germany and America in the late 1920s and early 1930s, for several related reasons: the new and untested Weimar Constitution, the repercussions of Germany’s military defeat, a diverse array of anti-democratic parties in Weimar Germany, and a profound disillusionment with Germany’s republican government, especially when compared to the United States. The paper acknowledges several important contextual differences between the two countries while underscoring how a rigorous comparative lens can be used to uncover how similar crises resulted in drastically divergent governmental outcomes.
Ajay Purohit (Mon,) studied this question.