Abstract This text offers a calm but structural diagnosis of a deeply normalized mode of thinking that has come to be widely regarded as rational, cautious, and professional, yet is quietly undermining human judgment, social responsibility, and civilizational stability. Science and technology have advanced precisely because they rely on systematic negation, trial and error, and the continuous elimination of incorrect paths. The denial of premature certainty—expressed through “not this,” “this does not work,” and “try again”—is not a weakness of science but its strength. In this sense, science’s disciplined use of negation is a necessary antidote to dogmatism and intellectual stagnation. Within the natural and technical domains, such logic is both correct and indispensable. However, when this same technological mode of thinking is uncritically transferred into social, ethical, and civilizational contexts, it undergoes a silent but consequential transformation. Expressions such as “I am not…,” “this is not…,” “it cannot be like this,” and “things are not that way” cease to function as tools for empirical correction and instead become habitual defensive postures in everyday reasoning. Rather than clarifying judgment, they postpone it; rather than strengthening responsibility, they diffuse it. When this pattern becomes fixed in daily life and public discourse, people rarely recognize its cumulative effects. Intellectual positions are increasingly shaped by self-protection, anticipation of others’ reactions, and the preservation of retreat routes, rather than by the formation of complete, accountable judgments. Over time, this erodes intellectual diversity and sophistication, diminishes natural freedom and inner vitality, and weakens the human capacity to stand behind one’s own conclusions. The most dangerous aspect of this process is that it does not appear dangerous at all. It presents itself as rationality, prudence, and maturity, while gradually transforming society into a space where incomplete ideas circulate freely and irreversible consequences are borne by others. Judgment retreats, responsibility disperses, and system-level outputs and trends take precedence over human agency. This text argues that the erosion of sociology and civilization does not stem from science itself, but from a methodological overreach in which scientific negation is mistaken for a universal model of human reasoning. Scientific denial is essential in its proper domain; when misapplied to social life, it becomes one of the most insidious scourges of civilization—not through overt error, but through the quiet cancellation of judgment. From this observation emerges a practical stance aligned with Harmondeg philosophy: in real-world practice, the principles and methods governing nature and scientific inquiry must be clearly distinguished from those governing society, ethics, and civilization. Only by maintaining this distinction can experimentation remain productive without becoming destructive, and progress remain meaningful without eroding the human foundations on which civilization depends.
Qingyun Hu-Yang (Sun,) studied this question.