Abstract This article seeks to demonstrate that Kant throughout the Critique of Pure Reason employs a type of analogical reasoning that belongs to the methodical backbone of the work. More specifically, I take him to draw on disciplines such as mathematics, general logic, and empirical psychology to expose the a priori features of human cognition at stake in his analyses. After examining Kant’s own comments on the use of analogies in the Critique of Pure Reason , the Prolegomena, the Critique of Judgment and relevant lecture transcripts, I outline the predicative type of analogical reasoning I take to be employed in the Critique of Pure Reason itself. Turning from theory to practice, I analyze Kant’s use of (1) metaphors, (2) analogical inferences intended to clarify concepts such as transcendental illusion, and (3) analogical inferences that inform key arguments, namely, the metaphysical deduction and the so-called subjective deduction contained in the 1781 edition of the Critique. In each case, I argue, Kant’s sustained attempt to illuminate the a priori dimension of the human mind by means of analogical inferences is akin to the use of analogical inferences in former natural theology to obtain cognitions of God.
Karin de Boer (Tue,) studied this question.