The works of military theorists such as Clausewitz, Foch, Lvy, Langlois, Ludendorff, etc. demonstrate different approaches to the development of military strategy and tactics in Germany and France on the eve of World War I. This study focuses on the development of military thought in the two major European powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The subject of the study is the works of German and French military theorists on the eve of World War I. The object of the study is the level of development of military thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Germany overestimated its capabilities and strengths and underestimated the strengths and capabilities of its opponents, which led to its defeat. The German doctrine, like the French doctrine, was based on achieving victory through military means and ignoring the economic factors that had a decisive impact on the course and outcome of the war. By using historical research methods, we analyzed and classified the main ideas of German and French military theorists, and compared and described their ideas, which helped us to provide an objective and specific analysis of the evolution of military thought in Germany and France on the eve of World War I. We also tried to reflect the historical conditions and specific features of the era in these countries. The main conclusion of our study is that Germany's military doctrine, driven by its policy of struggle for global domination, did not take into account the increasing importance of socio-economic factors in long-term warfare. French military doctrine was offensive. The Manual for Senior Army Commanders was permeated with the idea of an offensive, stating that the general battle and the battles fought by individual armies should be conducted in an offensive manner. The article focuses on the essence of Leval's strategic teaching, which, in our opinion, was underestimated in Russian historiography, in which he sought not just to create an abstract theory, but offered specific practical knowledge on warfare. The theorists of military thought in both Germany and France of that period often did not realize that the struggle required not only military-professional intellectual power, spiritual approval and active support from the whole society, but also enormous economic strength, modern weapons and equipment created on the basis of industrial production.
Irina V. Lokhova (Thu,) studied this question.