Despite historical shifts, “science” has consistently meant epistemic authority, perhaps leading enactivists to cast their work accordingly. Yet enactivism sits uneasily with Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, Hempel’s standards, and other philosophy of science benchmarks, but does better under Lakatos. Lakatos’s model holds that progressive science preserves a hardcore of principles by fiat, aligning with enactivism’s reliance on non-negotiable grounding tenets. However, Lakatos also requires testing that generates anomalies and yields novel predictions, exemplified by the postulation and discovery of a new planet to protect Newtonian mechanics. Enactivism struggles on this second step, sometimes ignoring anomalies, as with representational additions to Brooks’s robotics, or else engaging in what William James calls halfway empiricism—which definitionally pre-empts alternatives to maintain positions despite, rather than because of, evidence. James anticipates Feyerabend’s pluralism and his claim that scientific ideals—unified method, neutral observation, cumulative progress, and empirical fit—rarely match practices. From this angle, enactivism might count as a science, albeit only with diluted epistemic authority. James and Feyerabend offer an additional lesson: logical consistency matters in simple cases like rejecting “square circles,” but it is not obvious that the complexities of mind are explicable by a single, internally consistent theory.
Matthew Crippen (Mon,) studied this question.