Respect for patient dignity is recognized as an ethical commitment in healthcare, yet the concept often remains too abstract to guide clinical practice. This challenge is salient in mental health contexts, where patients may experience diminished autonomy, stigma, or institutional constraints. This paper develops a conceptual and normative analysis of dignity in mental health care by distinguishing between two conceptions: dignity as inherent worth and dignity-as-standing. Drawing on philosophical analysis, empirical literature, and global policy frameworks, the paper evaluates each conception’s practical implications for care. We argue that while dignity as inherent worth understands dignity as an intrinsic, non-natural value grounding human rights, it often remains too vague to guide clinical decision-making and may risk excluding patients with diminished autonomy. By contrast, dignity-as-standing conceives dignity not as a metaphysical value but as the elevated moral standing of persons that calls for treatment befitting their rank as members of the moral community. This conception offers a more action-guiding and inclusive framework for care, especially for patients with mental illness, disabilities, dementia, or advanced age. On this basis, we identify strategies for operationalizing dignity in practice, including recognizing autonomy as a continuum, implementing supported decision-making, respecting value-based refusals, and embedding relational, structural, and culturally responsive supports in care. The dignity-as-standing framework offers a practical and ethically coherent foundation for respecting patients’ dignity in mental health care, enabling clinicians and institutions to translate the ideal of dignity into concrete practices across diverse clinical and cultural contexts.
Turan et al. (Thu,) studied this question.