Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration marks a pivotal moment in the retreat from rule-based globalism. It signals a move towards neo-mercantilist bilateralism, where ‘Make America Great Again’ replaces multilateral norms with transactional bargaining. In this, the strategic competition of inordinately large-sized economies of the United States and China threatens to further erode the power of rule-based multilateralism, overtaking it with transnationalism. Their shared negation of various time-tested international arrangements—that undergirded global stability since the Second World War—has led the Trump administration to resurrect the ‘Monroe doctrine’ and reiterate American retreat from much of its global responsibilities. India, as a result, faces intensifying asymmetry with China and a growing US unpredictability, as also likely US retreat from the Indo-Pacific where India stands heavily invested. Amidst these blurring distinctions between partner and competitor identities in India’s engagement with Beijing and Washington DC, as also in US–China ties, this article examines the sustainability of India’s strategic autonomy posture. It examines how, in the face of competing frameworks of US-led AUKUS or China-led RCEP, India must operationalise an inclusive and non-militarised Quadrilateral Security Framework (Quad) and broaden its engagements with all other stakeholders in search of alternatives to any excessive dependence on the US or Chinese preponderance in the Indo-Pacific.
Swaran Singh (Sat,) studied this question.