"An ogre at our doorstep": Can the Russian threat unite Europe?

This paper examines whether the perception of a Russian threat can serve as a unifying force for the European Union (EU) in the field of security and defense. Triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European political discourse has increasingly framed Moscow as an aggressive and expansionist power posing a continental-scale danger. This narrative, vividly articulated by French President Emmanuel Macron's depiction of Russia as an "ogre at Europe's doorstep," has been used to justify accelerated militarization, deeper defense integration, and renewed calls for European strategic autonomy independent of the United States. The paper critically reassesses these assumptions. The central argument is that emphasizing the Russian threat is insufficient to generate a cohesive and unified European defense policy. The analysis proceeds along two main lines. First, it questions the credibility of portraying Russia as an existential threat to the entire European security architecture. Second, it demonstrates that Russia's actions do not generate uniform levels of concern across EU member states due to divergent threat perceptions and particular interests. The theoretical framework is grounded in realism, primarily Stephen Walt's theory of the balance of threat and Randall Schweller's theory of the balance of interests. The balance of threat approach highlights that states respond not simply to power but to a combination of aggregate capabilities, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Applying these criteria shows that while Russia remains a major power with significant military capacity - especially in nuclear weapons - its overall resources lag behind the combined economic, demographic, and military capacities of the EU. The war in Ukraine has further exposed the limits of Russian conventional power: despite four years of fighting, Russia has failed to secure a decisive victory, indicating that its offensive capabilities were widely overestimated prior to the invasion. Consequently, Russia does not constitute a potential European hegemon comparable to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Threat perception within Europe also varies significantly. States geographically closer to Russia often perceive Moscow as a far greater danger than Southern and Western European countries. Public opinion data confirms that proximity strongly correlates with threat perception, undermining the idea of a shared, continent-wide sense of existential danger. In the absence of a unifying threat of hegemonic proportions, divergent interests within the EU become more salient. Here, Schweller's balance of interests theory is particularly useful. The paper argues that several EU member states and political movements behave as "jackals": actors dissatisfied with certain aspects of the status quo but unwilling to accept the costs and risks of radical change. This dynamic is visible in the rise of sovereigntist and populist forces that resist further supranational integration, especially in sensitive areas such as defense and security. These trends weaken political support for a genuinely integrated European defense. At the same time, uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations complicates European strategic choices. Although concerns about declining U.S. commitment - especially after Donald Trump's return to the White House - have intensified calls for autonomy, most European states still prioritize preserving the NATO framework and American security guarantees over assuming full responsibility for continental defense. The paper concludes that the war in Ukraine has not fundamentally transformed the EU into a cohesive strategic actor. Russia represents a serious but limited challenge rather than an existential threat to Europe as a whole. Without such a unifying danger, internal divisions, competing national interests, and continued reliance on the United States will continue to obstruct the development of a unified European defense and genuine strategic autonomy.