Was Serfdom Good for the Economy?

Abstract Some recent theories have sought to rehabilitate serfdom, postulating that it could have been economically beneficial because lords used their institutional power to address pre-modern market failures. This article tests these claims through a detailed case study of a large lordly estate in early modern Bohemia. It investigates the supposed benefits of lordly mills, credit provision, money dues, labour services, demesne enterprises, and manorial administration. The analysis of extensive archival evidence reveals a picture very different from the one proposed by the rehabilitation theories. Peasant enterprise, private credit, and nonmanorial mills were widespread, while lordly interventions often proved to be extractive, monopolistic, and inefficient, creating obstacles to peasant initiative. The study concludes that strong lordship, far from being a solution to market imperfections, was frequently part of the problem, and that peasant enterprise developed more effectively in interstices free of lordly coercion.