Abstract This article critically examines the application of cramdown provisions under China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, with a focus on whether courts have meaningfully implemented the principle of judicial prudence emphasized by the Supreme People's Court. Drawing on an empirical analysis of post‐2018 judicial decisions, the article finds that while courts formally comply with statutory requirements, such as voting thresholds and restrained use of public interest, they often lack substantive engagement in reviewing valuation assumptions, feasibility assessments and creditor objections. This procedural conformity has turned cramdown into a tool for expedient plan approval, rather than a mechanism to safeguard fairness and encourage good‐faith negotiation. The article identifies deeper institutional and legislative deficiencies, including vague statutory language, limited judicial capacity, and the absence of structured safeguards, which collectively undermine the intended role of cramdown as a protective device for dissenting creditors. To address these challenges, the article advocates three key refinements: prioritizing tiered distribution to ensure equitable outcomes for small creditors, establishing structured feasibility assessment criteria, and equipping judges with reliable valuation tools. By institutionalizing these refinements, Chinese courts can move beyond formal compliance toward substantive prudence, restoring cramdown as a principled instrument for resolving complex corporate reorganizations.
Zhang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
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