In the context of China’s rapid urbanization and rural land marketization reforms, the entry of rural collectively owned commercial construction land into the market (ERCCCLM) coexists with the traditional government-led land expropriation, forming a dual land supply system. China’s dual-structure land ownership system—where urban land belongs to the state and rural land to rural collectives—aims to balance land market allocation efficiency with government regulation for public interests. However, significant differences exist between the two patterns in terms of revenue distribution, risk-bearing, and institutional constraints. Consequently, stakeholders including rural collective economic organizations, farmers, local governments, and development companies face dilemmas in selecting land supply patterns, thereby limiting land resource allocation efficiency. The research employs multidimensional economic analysis to systematically compare the ERCCCLM and land expropriation patterns, establishing a land supply pattern selection mechanism with land market price and compensation for expropriation as key variables. First, the expenditure and revenue of stakeholders in both patterns were clarified based on relevant documents, and investment revenue models were constructed. Second, through comparative analysis of revenue formation mechanisms across land supply patterns and sensitivity analysis of multi-scenario calculations, the land market price and compensation for expropriation are identified as key variables determining economic revenue. The findings indicate that when the land market price exceeds compensation for expropriation, ERCCCLM generates higher economic revenue for the rural collective economic organization and farmer. Conversely, when the land market price is equal to or lower than the compensation for expropriation, land expropriation provides more stable revenue. The land expropriation and ERCCCLM examined in this research represent a unique land expropriation and utilization system exclusive to China. The proposed selection mechanism improves land market distribution efficiency and informs policy discussions on optimizing land supply patterns, ensuring a balance between market efficiency and stakeholder equity.
Teng et al. (Thu,) studied this question.