The problem of other minds remains one of the central and most persistent challenges in philosophy of mind, raising the question of how we can reasonably justify the belief that other human beings, apart from ourselves, possess conscious experiences. Traditional explanations, such as analogical reasoning and behaviourist approaches, have attempted to answer this challenge, yet none has fully resolved the scepticism attached to it. In this paper, we introduce a biological perspective designated as The Twin Analogy. This analogy takes its foundation from the case of biological twins who, though separated as distinct beings at birth, share the same organs, body structure, and genetic basis. From this shared biological foundation, it becomes rational to infer that if one twin possesses a mind, the other must also possess one. Such a move provides a biological ground for attributing mindedness beyond the self. The analogy is not intended merely as a thought experiment but as a practical framework for wider debates in philosophy of mind, with implications for artificial intelligence, intersubjectivity, and moral philosophy.
Fagbemi et al. (Fri,) studied this question.