The Failing Naval Deterrence and the Understated Proneness to War between China and the United States

In the human history of warfare and great power contests, ample examples point to competitions and confrontations around the sea. When waterbodies cut great powers off from existential threats, countries still pay close attention to their safety at sea. Contrary to some scholarly forecasts that sea may geographically safeguard the relations between China and the United States, today's world sees an intensifying danger of military clash as China is expanding its naval assets and the U.S. reluctant to give up its naval hegemony. What is the likelihood of war between China and the U.S. relative to that during the Cold War, considering the existence of waters that separates the two players and significantly limits the possibilities of a land war? This thesis addresses the facilitative role of waterbodies in a great power competition and argues that a water-rich geopolitical setting that only allows for a naval war – for example the Indo-Pacific – would be much more war-prone than those in which land wars may break out – in a case such as the central front during the Cold War. By examining the potential hotspots in the Sino-U.S. security competition, it raises that, for geographical reasons a war will most likely take place at sea should it really happen. Meanwhile, the limited nature of naval wars, resulting in the smaller risk of escalation of conflicts at sea and the lack of offense-defense distinguishability contributes to the overall fragility of naval deterrence and war-proneness in East Asia. When naval war is the only option of warfare, the structural factors join together and force the proneness for a great power competition to evolve into a hegemonic war to become much greater. Therefore, the current academia is underestimating the probability of a war between China and the U.S., due to the underappreciated facilitating effect of the naval component.