What question did this study set out to answer?

To examine how the CJEU can enforce constitutional requirements for member states withdrawing from the EU.

July 14, 2026

Article 50(1) of the TEU: The member states’ “own constitutional requirements” for withdrawal before the CJEU

PPPolly Ruth PolakUniversidad de Salamanca

Key Points

To examine how the CJEU can enforce constitutional requirements for member states withdrawing from the EU.
Legal analysis of article 50(1) of the TEU
Examination of recent CJEU case law
Evaluation of the constitutional implications of EU withdrawal.
The CJEU can establish minimum constitutional standards for withdrawal procedures.
A framework is proposed for treating withdrawal as balancing between treaty exit and secession.
Judicialization of democratic values in withdrawal notifications is supported by recent trends.

Abstract

Abstract The Court of Justice of the European Union could exercise control over a withdrawal notification under article 50(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and establish a common framework of minimum constitutional standards for exercising the right of withdrawal from the European Union (EU). To that end, the court could continue to judicialize article 2 of the TEU in line with recent case law and operationalize the value of democracy in the context of a withdrawal notification. Given the constitutional magnitude of withdrawal, the court could treat EU withdrawal as somewhere in between a treaty exit and a secession, drawing inspiration both from recent trends on democratization of treaty making and unmaking as well as from the recent constitutionalization of secessions.

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