The Prudential 'Now What?' Problem

Abstract The ‘Now What?’ problem for moral error theorists concerns whether (and how) error theorists should maintain or abolish moral discourse. If moral discourse is systematically error-ridden, one must decide whether to abandon it, as we have abandoned talk of phlogiston, or maintain it, as most mathematical error theorists retain number discourse. Prompted by companions-in-guilt arguments, some moral error theorists have also endorsed prudential error theories. These developments pave the way for a novel metanormative debate — a ‘Now What?’ problem for prudential discourse. Just as moral error theorists must decide what to do with their error-ridden discourse, so must prudential error theorists decide what to do with theirs. This paper addresses this novel problem, by (i) arguing that multiple forms of moral error theory lead to prudential error theory, (ii) characterising the prudential ‘Now What?’ problem, and (iii) proposing a method for how error theorists can answer it (and practically deliberate in general). Finally, (iv) the paper takes a substantive position on the debate by recommending that moral and prudential error theorists adopt metaphorist prudential fictionalism.