What question did this study set out to answer?

To investigate structural preconditions for developing internality related to consciousness in Difference Monism.

April 30, 2026Open Access

The Hard Problem Is Not a Bridge Between Two Substances, But the Formation of Internality: Structural Preconditions of Consciousness in Difference Monism

Key Points

To investigate structural preconditions for developing internality related to consciousness in Difference Monism.
Reformulates the hard problem of consciousness.
Identifies four threshold conditions for internality: stable boundary, internal differentiability, folded-back inheritance, subject-level integration.
Distinguishes Difference Monism from other theories like IIT, GNW, and illusionism.
Establishes that complete third-person translation cannot completely replace first-person subjective experience.

Abstract

This paper reformulates the hard problem of consciousness within the framework of Difference Monism (DM). Rather than asking how physical processes bridge to subjective experience, it asks: what kind of structure develops internality sufficient to host consciousness? The paper identifies four threshold conditions (stable boundary, internal differentiability, folded-back inheritance, subject-level integration), distinguishes DM from IIT/GNW/illusionism, and establishes a falsifiable negative boundary claim: complete third-person translation cannot residuelessly substitute first-person access. English preprint.

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