The Continuity of Morality Bridging Relativism and Universalism: A Convergent Structure Based on Harm to Being

The Continuity of Morality Bridging Relativism and Universalism:A Convergent Structure Based on Harm to Being 1. Introduction This theory aims to explain that “wrong” and “sin” are not absolute or fixed standards, but rather emerge from individual subjectivities and are formed through collective interactions, gradually converging in particular directions. Traditional ethical theories have largely been developed in the forms of deontology, grounded in absolute rules; consequentialism, focused on outcomes; or forms of radical relativism. However, these approaches fail to adequately explain how moral judgments can vary across individuals while still producing widely shared evaluations in certain cases. To address this gap, the present theory proposes an integrated account of moral judgment formation and convergence, centered on the concepts of Being and Harm to Being. 2. Core Proposition Wrong is not an absolute or a priori standard, but is best understood as the result of subjectivities—formed on the basis of shared human conditions—gradually converging according to the degree of harm inflicted upon being. This convergence is continuous in nature and may simultaneously be distorted by collective interactions and social structures. 3. Definitions of Core Concepts 3.1 Being Being refers to the fundamental conditions shared by all human beings, including survival, avoidance of suffering, and the formation and maintenance of relationships. 3.2 Harm to Being Harm to Being refers to any action that weakens or destroys the conditions of an individual’s existence, including physical, psychological, and social dimensions. 3.3 Convergence Convergence is the process by which individual subjectivities gradually align into similar moral judgments based on the degree of harm to being. 3.4 Distortion Distortion refers to the phenomenon in which moral convergence is shaped in ways that diverge from actual harm to being, due to factors such as group psychology, power structures, and asymmetries of information. 4. Structure of the Formation of Wrong Wrong is formed through the following sequential process: Subjectivity → Consensus → Convergence → Norm → Law 1. Individuals form moral judgments based on their own experiences and standards. 2. Similar judgments develop into collective consensus through interaction. 3. The greater the harm to being, the stronger the convergence of judgment. 4. Converged judgments become social norms. 5. Norms of sufficient strength are institutionalized into law. 5. Continuity of Harm to Being Wrong is not a binary category, but rather exists along a continuous spectrum. * Low-level harm: preference conflicts, minor rudeness * Moderate harm: insult, repeated disregard * High-level harm: social exclusion, violence * Extreme harm: elimination of existence (e.g., genocide) As the degree of harm to being increases, moral judgments tend to converge more strongly across individuals. 6. Distorted Convergence Not all convergence is justified. In phenomena such as bullying, moral panics, or the displacement of responsibility through power, substantial harm to being may occur while the group nevertheless perceives such actions as justified or unproblematic. In such cases, these judgments are better understood not as the result of a pure recognition of harm to being, but as outcomes of distorted convergence influenced by power relations, group dynamics, and social pressures. This suggests that moral judgment is not determined solely by the degree of harm to being, but is also shaped and transformed within social structures. 7. Case-Based Validation 7.1. Moral Judgment Reversal in Group Bullying One of the characteristic phenomena observed in group bullying is the reversal of moral judgment, in which the actual victim becomes the target of moral blame. This phenomenon is difficult to fully explain within traditional ethical frameworks. Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics evaluates actions based on universalizability and rule compliance, but has limitations in explaining the social dynamics through which a group collectively assigns blame to a specific individual. Similarly, John Stuart Mill’s consequentialism assesses actions based on resulting harm and utility, yet does not sufficiently account for the process by which groups distort the perception of an evidently harmful situation. In contrast, the present framework establishes “Harm to Being” as the central criterion for moral judgment. In cases of group bullying, what actually occurs is a significant impairment of the victim’s conditions of being, including psychological stability and social relations. Accordingly, such actions should, in principle, converge toward being recognized as morally wrong at a high level. However, in reality, this convergence often fails to occur, and instead, moral judgment is redirected toward blaming the victim. This framework explains such cases as instances of “distorted convergence.” That is, when factors such as power relations, conformity pressure, and diffusion of responsibility intervene, moral judgments may converge in a direction that is inconsistent with the actual degree of harm to being. Thus, the present framework accounts for both (1) why the action is inherently wrong (harm to being), and (2) why it is not recognized as wrong in practice (distorted convergence), thereby extending explanatory power beyond existing theories. 7.2. Asymmetric Moral Standards Toward the Vulnerable Another observable phenomenon is the tendency for more stringent moral standards to be applied to socially vulnerable individuals, while relatively lenient standards are applied to those with greater power or influence. Traditional ethical theories struggle to fully account for this asymmetry. From a deontological perspective, moral rules are expected to apply universally and equally, making it difficult to explain why, in practice, identical actions are judged differently depending on the individual. From a consequentialist perspective, moral evaluation depends on outcomes, yet it remains insufficient in explaining why similar or even less harmful actions by vulnerable individuals are often judged more harshly than more severe actions by those in positions of power. Within the present framework, this phenomenon can again be understood through the interaction between harm to being and distorted convergence. In principle, moral judgments should converge in proportion to the degree of harm inflicted upon being. However, in real social contexts, power asymmetries, social influence, and network structures affect the formation of collective judgment. As a result, actions that produce relatively minor harm may be amplified and judged severely when associated with vulnerable individuals, while actions that produce greater harm may be minimized or overlooked when associated with powerful individuals. This represents a systematic distortion in the convergence process, where the direction and intensity of moral judgment no longer correspond to the actual degree of harm to being. Therefore, the present framework not only explains how moral judgments ideally converge, but also how and why such convergence becomes structurally distorted in real-world social contexts. 8. Discussion This theory provides a unified explanation for the following: * Why moral judgments differ across individuals * Why certain actions elicit widespread negative consensus * Why groups sometimes converge toward distorted moral judgments Thus, moral judgment can be understood not as a fixed or purely relative phenomenon, but as a dynamic and structured process. 9. Conclusion Wrong and sin are not fixed truths, but concepts that emerge from individual subjectivities and gradually converge based on the shared foundation of harm to being. However, such convergence does not always proceed in a valid direction and remains susceptible to distortion through social structures and collective dynamics.