The Dilemma and Innovation of the Selection Rules of Appeal Body in WTO Dispute Resolution

In the global trade governance system, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the core pillar of maintaining the multilateral trade order, and the effective operation of its Appellate Body is crucial. However, the United States has been continuously obstructing the appointment of new members of the Appellate Body since 2017, resulting in the agency's suspension due to insufficient quorum in December 2019 and exposing the institutional flaws of the selection rules amid political games. This article focuses on the dilemmas and innovations of selection rules, employing normative analysis, case-based empirical research, and comparative research methods to examine the structural loopholes in the rules and the impact of political intervention. The study finds that the ambiguity of the consensus voting mechanism and qualification standards is the root cause of the problem. It proposes an innovative pathway centered on clarifying professional qualifications, introducing majority decision-making procedures, and strengthening independent evaluation, providing a theoretical reference for revitalizing the dispute resolution mechanism.