Planning the French intervention in Southern Russia in 1918

The article is dedicated to the analysis of the French intervention in southern Russia in 1918-1919, undertaken in the context of the end of World War I, the collapse of the Central Powers, and the escalation of the Civil War in Russia. The subject of the research is France's military-political strategies in the post-war period, its attempts to expand influence in the territories of the former Russian Empire, as well as the internal logic of decision-making within the French military and diplomatic leadership. Special attention is given to the interaction of French representatives with the Volunteer Army, the assessment of resources involved in the campaign, and the degree of realism of the developed plans. The work covers both France's strategic objectives and the practical difficulties in implementing them in the conditions of political instability, logistical constraints, and diplomatic contradictions. The goal of the research is to identify the political, military, and organizational factors that influenced the formation of the strategy of the French command and the reasons for the failure of the intervention. Methodologically, the work is based on the analysis of official documents, correspondence of the military command, and diplomatic telegrams that allow tracing the decision-making process and the contradictions within the French authority. A systemic approach is also applied, taking into account the political context and international interests of the Entente. As a result, it has been established that despite the declared aim of supporting anti-Bolshevik forces, the intervention had a largely economic-political character and was oriented towards restoring French influence and assets in the region. The French strategy suffered from a lack of coherence between the army and naval commands, resource shortages, unclear mandates, and troop demoralization. All of this led to the failure of ambitious plans, which were limited to control over coastal ports. The results of the work may be useful in researching France's foreign policy strategy, the history of interventions, and international involvement in civil conflicts. The conclusions of the article emphasize that the intervention, conceived as a means of influence, proved to be ineffective due to systemic management errors and a strategic overestimation of capabilities.