This study analyzes the outcomes of Chinese finance and its interplay with local developmental state capacity (LDSC) in middle-income countries. It focuses on two major Latin American hydroelectric dam projects: Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam and Argentina’s Patagonia dams. Both projects involve Chinese contractors. Argentina and Brazil, as semi-peripheral countries, are the largest economies in South America and have developed significant expertise in the energy sector. But despite their similar economic and political backgrounds, Brazil successfully completed the Belo Monte project, while Argentina has struggled to finish the Patagonia dams even after a decade. This study contributes to the debate on the impacts of Chinese finance in Global South countries. I argue that there is a systemic trend of increasing Chinese finance and technology in green energy value chains, either through investments as grid operators or via engineering, procurement, and construction contracts. However, the outcomes of Chinese involvement in hydroelectric dam projects depend on the borrower’s LDSC. The oscillation between neoliberalism and neodevelopmentalism in Argentina and Brazil has generated different levels of LDSC, which have, in turn, influenced the success or failure of these hydroelectric projects. I evaluate LDSC through three main indicators: domestic financial tools; institutional capacities and continuity despite changes in administration; and external constraints.
María José Haro Sly (Wed,) studied this question.