Network operators increasingly rely on abstracted telemetry (e.g., flow records and time-aggregated statistics) to achieve scalable monitoring of high-speed networks, but this abstraction fundamentally constrains the forensic and security inferences that can be supported from network data. We present a design-time audit framework that evaluates which threat hypotheses become non-supportable as network evidence is transformed from packet-level traces to flow records and time-aggregated statistics. Our methodology examines three evidence layers (L0: packet headers, L1: IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) flow records, L2: time-aggregated flows), computes a catalog of 13 network-forensic artifacts (e.g., destination fan-out, inter-arrival time burstiness, SYN-dominant connection patterns) at each layer, and maps artifact availability to tactic support using literature-grounded associations with MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK). Applied to backbone traffic from the MAWI Day-In-The-Life (DITL) archive, the audit reveals selectiveinference loss: Execution becomes non-supportable at L1 (due to loss of packet-level timing artifacts), while Lateral Movement and Persistence become non-supportable at L2 (due to loss of entity-linked structural artifacts). Inference coverage decreases from 9 to 7 out of 9 evaluated ATT&CK tactics, while coverage of defensive countermeasures (MITRE D3FEND) increases at L1 (7 → 8 technique categories) then decreases at L2 (8 → 7), reflecting a shift from behavioral monitoring to flow-based controls. The framework provides network architects with a practical tool for configuring telemetry systems (e.g., IPFIX exporters, P4 pipelines) to reason about and provision the minimum forensic coverage.
Vaseghipanah et al. (Thu,) studied this question.