Abstract According to a venerable historical narrative, a crucial step in the development of the modern picture of the mind occurred when Descartes argued that sensing occurs in the immaterial human mind, together with thought and volition. The mind, the story goes, had once been the home only of rational thought and volition, with sensations being embodied phenomena, much like digestion, growth, or weaving. However, I show in this article that the view that human sensations are immaterial, non‐extended modifications of the immaterial human intellect rose to prominence in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. In Section 1, I examine the background for this fourteenth‐century immaterial turn in the more familiar views of sensation prominent in the thirteenth century. In Section 2, I show how the view that human sensation is just as immaterial as thought emerged in the work of some of William of Ockham's associates in England. In Section 3, I bring to light two important developments in the way philosophers thought about the nature of sensation that led to the Immaterial Turn. In Section 4, I briefly discuss a puzzle about the way scholastics in the Immaterial Turn conceived of sensation.
Jordan Lavender (Fri,) studied this question.