International humanitarian law (IHL) has three main principles that guide armed conflict, one of which is the principle of distinction. This principle affirms the obligation of every party to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians, thereby protecting civilians from the direct impact of military attacks. However, advances in military technology, particularly the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), present new challenges. In some cases, drones are operated in densely populated civilian areas, significantly increasing the risk of innocent civilian casualties. This study aims to analyze the application of the principle of distinction in IHL to drone operations in civilian areas. The method used is normative legal research with a statutory regulatory approach, particularly international treaties in the field of humanitarian law, and descriptive normative analysis techniques. The results of the study indicate that legal accountability for violations of the principle of distinction in the use of drones in civilian areas still faces a regulatory vacuum. IHL only contains provisions on limitations and prohibitions as stated in Article 12, Article 41 paragraph (1), and Article 52 paragraph (1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, without explicitly regulating the accountability mechanism. So far, responsibility for violations of the principle of distinction has generally been placed on the losing party in a conflict through ad hoc courts or permanent international criminal courts. This condition has implications for weak law enforcement, increased serious violations of IHL, and increased escalation of conflict and international distrust.
Ariestu et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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