Abstract Jeremy Bentham's question (“Can they suffer?”), and its centralization of suffering, remains a notorious contribution to animal ethics. In this article, I begin by problematizing Peter Singer's interpretation of Bentham's question—an interpretation that remains hegemonic in contemporary animal ethics—and highlight its latent anthropocentrism. Then, I reread Bentham's question through Jacques Derrida, arguing for Derrida's interpretation's force in deconstructing anthropocentrism. Despite the advancements in animal welfare that Singer's thought has propelled, his interpretation of Bentham's question contributes to a reaffirmation of anthropocentrism/carnophallogocentrism, since the “capacity to suffer” is interpreted as a power tout court, indexing it, consequently, to several powers or capacities, resulting in a hierarchy of human and animal suffering and in a disregard for the philosophical problem of putting another animal to death. Derrida's reading of Bentham's centralization of suffering requires the affirmation of a fundamental vulnerability that amounts to a fundamental nonpower, common to all finite, mortal beings. I demonstrate that Bentham's legacy gains a revolutionary impulse, which should inform animal philosophy today, when read through Derrida, because, by decentralizing power, it questions the anthropo-carnophallogocentric subject (the human, male, powerful, carnivorous subject), thus aiding in delineating a compassionate ethical relation with other animals.
Mariana Almeida Pereira (Thu,) studied this question.