This work presents a qualitative historical case study examining the military leadership and tactical decision-making of Lieutenant Colonel László Pokorny (1905–1975) within the Royal Hungarian Army (Magyar Királyi Honvédség) during the period 1927–1945. Despite growing scholarly interest in Hungary's participation in the Second World War, individual tactical commanders—particularly those who served in specialized formations such as the paratrooper battalions—remain significantly underrepresented in English-language academic literature. This study addresses that lacuna by reconstructing and analyzing Pokorny's military career from his commissioning at the Ludovika Royal Hungarian Military Academy in 1927 through his catastrophic wounding at the Battle of Dunaharaszti on November 8, 1944, where he sustained 43 shrapnel wounds and lost his left eye while commanding the Royal Hungarian 1st Parachute Battalion. The study employs a dual theoretical framework integrating Carl von Clausewitz's concepts of moral forces, friction, and the fog of war with Bernard Bass's transformational leadership theory and its Four I's model (Idealized Influence, Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation, and Individualized Consideration). Methodologically, the research applies a single-subject biographical case study design informed by Yin's (2018) and Stake's (1995) case study traditions, utilizing chronological analysis, tactical METT-TC reconstruction, transformational leadership assessment, Clausewitzian analysis, comparative officer analysis, and thematic coding of primary and secondary sources drawn from the Hungarian Military History Institute and Museum, the Memory of War Heroes database, and published scholarly works. Findings reveal that Pokorny exemplified a front-line, courage-centered, tactically adaptive leadership style shaped by elite institutional training, progressive technical specialization, and crisis-tested command experience. His transformational leadership profile was strongest in Idealized Influence, driven by repeated demonstrations of personal courage under fire, while his tactical decisions at Transcarpathia (1939) and Dunaharaszti (1944) reflected aggressive local initiative and adaptive employment of available resources under conditions of extreme friction and uncertainty. The study contributes to Hungarian military historiography by providing the first comprehensive scholarly examination of Pokorny's leadership, extending transformational leadership theory to historical combat contexts, and preserving an important dimension of Hungarian military heritage for future scholarship.
Laszlo Pokorny (Mon,) studied this question.