• Sheep and goat pox (SGP) in Greece (2024–2025) is analysed as both an animal-health emergency and a governance stress-test. • The paper integrates epidemiological reasoning with political economy, mechanism design, and liberal public-policy criteria. • A coherent outbreak-response ‘operating system’ is proposed, jointly designing compensation, enforcement, traceability, and risk communication. • Incentive-compatible measures are identified to reduce concealment, moral hazard, and non-compliance under state-capacity constraints. • The framework provides transferable lessons for EU-aligned preparedness and response in small-ruminant production systems. The 2024-2025 sheep and goat pox (SGP) epidemic in Greece exposed a structural paradox at the heart of Category A disease governance. the stricter the legal obligations, the weaker the individual incentive to comply. Over fifteen months, 1,905 farms were confirmed positive across more than a dozen regional units, and weekly new confirmations exceeded 100 in the autumn of 2025, more than a year after the first confirmed case. This paper argues that the outbreak trajectory cannot be understood through epidemiological models alone. It is co-produced by strategic behaviour, limits on administrative capacity, and fractured trust between producers and the state. Drawing on an interdisciplinary framework that integrates veterinary epidemiology, agricultural economics, mechanism design, and liberal political theory, the paper analyses the Greek SGP episode as a collective action failure under severe legal constraints. The empirical section documents the spatial concentration and temporal ‘wave’ structure of the outbreak using official laboratory data. The analytical section models reporting and movement compliance as strategic dilemmas and evaluates existing policy instruments, including zoning, stamping-out, compensation, and surveillance, against criteria of incentive compatibility, proportionality, and administrative feasibility. The paper proposes an integrated five-component policy package. a standing Incident Command System with predefined surge protocols; a real-time digital movement-permission system; rapid, conditional two-tranche compensation; co-regulation with producer organisations; and risk communication designed to convert compliance into collective solidarity rather than stigmatised obligation. The broader conclusion is that SGP governance in Greece must be treated as critical infrastructure, designed in advance rather than assembled under emergency conditions.
I Kaimakamis (Fri,) studied this question.