Low-carbon service outsourcing creates a governance problem in which manufacturers must address hidden emission-reduction capability before contracting and hidden effort after contracting. Consumer low-carbon preference does not automatically translate into market returns, because consumers rely on information disclosure, certification, carbon labeling, and traceability to perceive actual emission-reduction performance. This study develops a principal–agent model for a low-carbon service supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a low-carbon service provider. The baseline model examines screening and effort incentives under dual information asymmetry, the extended static model introduces heterogeneous consumer preferences and information perception, and the dynamic model incorporates consumer trust evolution. The results show that menu contracts enable manufacturers to distinguish service-provider types and induce emission-reduction effort, but truthful self-selection requires information rent. Consumer low-carbon preference strengthens incentive intensity only when disclosure converts actual emission-reduction performance into perceived low-carbon value. Disclosure investment improves the market return of emission-reduction effort, but its effectiveness is constrained by disclosure cost, provider risk aversion, and output uncertainty. Consumer low-carbon trust converges to a steady state supported by sustained emission-reduction effort and credible disclosure. The conclusions apply primarily to low-carbon service outsourcing settings in which provider capability and effort are difficult to observe and market response depends on consumers’ perception of low-carbon information. This study extends principal–agent analysis to low-carbon service supply chains and shows that effective low-carbon governance depends on the coordination of contract incentives, information disclosure, and trust accumulation.
Chen et al. (Tue,) studied this question.