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A growing body of literature explores the nature and effectiveness of opposition electoral strategies under competitive authoritarianism. One such strategy is the formation of broad pre-electoral coalitions. But what happens when both the incumbent and the opposition require grand coalitions to win elections? How do their coalition-building strategies interact, and what are the implications for electoral outcomes? This study addresses these questions by examining the ruling party- and opposition-led pre-electoral coalitions in Turkey's 2023 elections. The multi-party opposition coalition in Turkey was defeated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led-alliance of (far-)right parties. This paper argues that the ruling coalition successfully obstructed the formation of a grand opposition alliance, devalued the opposition coalition once it was formed, and delegitimised it by associating it with terrorism. Combined with the opposition's internal weaknesses in coalition formation and maintenance, these strategies enabled the ruling bloc to sustain its image of competent governance. The analysis demonstrates that populist autocrats in polarised societies can transform coalition-building into an election-winning strategy for themselves and a liability for the opposition. While the strategic missteps of the opposition contribute to its failure, authoritarian manipulation can prove more decisive in shaping the electoral outcome.
Begüm Uzun (Thu,) studied this question.