Under a dual-carbon background, promoting substantive green innovation in manufacturing enterprises has become a central topic in green transition research. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving manufacturing enterprises and consumers under market mechanisms and government intervention to analyze the evolutionary patterns and stability conditions of their strategic choices. Using case data and numerical simulations, it explores the role of government guidance in addressing market failures and fostering green innovation in manufacturing. The findings reveal the following: (1) Under market mechanisms, system evolution is influenced by multiple factors. If enterprises prioritize short-term gains by accelerating symbolic green innovation, consumer trust erodes, leading to a shift toward traditional consumption and ultimately driving the system toward market failure. (2) Under government intervention, incentive subsidies must reach a specific threshold to effectively guide manufacturers toward substantive green innovation. Such subsidies also lower the marginal cost of low-carbon consumption, enhancing consumer willingness to purchase green products. Furthermore, government regulation demonstrates positive promoting effects on the green behaviors of both manufacturers and consumers, with a more pronounced impact on the former. (3) The policy combination of incentive subsidies and government supervision significantly shapes evolutionary trajectories through a synergistic mechanism of “reward incentives and regulatory rigidity.” Policy mismatches may trap the system in market failure. Only when subsidy intensity sufficiently compensates for innovation costs and regulatory capacity exceeds enforcement efficiency thresholds can the system stably evolve toward a substantive green innovation, low-carbon consumption state, fostering a virtuous cycle of supply–demand synergy.
Su et al. (Thu,) studied this question.