Active Defense-Based Resilient Sliding Mode Control Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

This paper investigates the problem of the resilient control for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in the presence of malicious sensor denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which result in the loss of state information. The concepts of DoS frequency and DoS duration are introduced to describe the DoS attacks. According to the attack situation, that is, whether the attack is successfully implemented or not, the original physical system is rewritten as a switched version. A resilient sliding mode control scheme is designed to guarantee that the physical process is exponentially stable, which is a foundation of the main results. Then, a zero-sum game is employed to establish an effective mixed defense mechanism. Furthermore, a defense-based resilient sliding mode control scheme is proposed and the desired control performance is achieved. Compared with the existing results, the differences mainly lie in two aspects, that is, one where a switched model is obtained, based on which the average dwell-time like approach is utilized to derive the resilient control scheme, and the other where the zero-sum game in employed to make the attacks satisfy the concepts of DoS frequency and DoS duration. Finally, simulation results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed resilient control approach.