Abstract With China and the United States seemingly locked in intensifying and enduring competition, many analysts compare today's U.S.-China rivalry with the one between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. This article draws on the stability-instability paradox to compare the prospect for limited war in these scenarios. We identify two factors, geography and technology, that affect the likelihood of the paradox leading to conflict. We find that limited conventional war—which may escalate to a limited nuclear war—is more likely in maritime East Asia than a land war was in Cold War Europe. Whether strategic nuclear stability increases or decreases the likelihood of limited conflict likely depends on how each side in a conflict dyad regards the prospects for limiting a conflict. To some, the greater prospect of limited war implies that the United States should attempt to maintain full escalation dominance, including by deploying additional theater nuclear systems in East Asia and bolstering its security guarantees to Taiwan. Others may argue that the United States should consider abandoning Taiwan and retrench by balancing China's regional ambitions with strongpoints and allies farther from the Chinese mainland. Ultimately, the choice depends on how much the United States values Taiwan, how much abandoning the island would damage its credibility, and how much risk it is willing to incur to defend Taiwan.
Hiim et al. (Wed,) studied this question.