We present an axiomatic model of adversarial symbolic interaction rooted in information theory and optimal stopping. Within a stylized continuous-time framework, we show that an Initiator who is committed to sustaining a high-complexity symbolic system faces a cumulative utility that diverges to negative infinity as the commitment horizon grows. By contrast, we model the Responder's position as a real option and characterize the value extraction problem as a strictly concave optimal-stopping problem. We derive a closed-form Dominance Coefficient c (L0) c (L₀) c (L0), giving the measure of parameter configurations under which engagement is profitable for the Responder. In high-complexity regimes, this coefficient decays inversely in the base complexity L0L₀L0, so that long-run initiation becomes generically loss-making while profitable response opportunities become measure-zero in the limit.
Jarred Ramo (Thu,) studied this question.