Contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, following Plantinga's influential The Nature of Necessity (1974), defines perfect being theology as the maximization of great-making properties. The standard problem of divine foreknowledge concerns human freedom. This paper explores a different problem: divine freedom. If God has infallible knowledge of His own future actions, then those actions are settled in a way that seems to rule out the power to do otherwise. I develop this argument formally, drawing on Plantinga's definitions, and examine three standard responses to the foreknowledge problem, the non-causal defense, Molinism, and the hard/soft fact distinction. None, I argue, succeeds in preserving divine freedom. This leaves a trilemma: deny infallible self-knowledge, deny libertarian divine freedom, or embrace mystery. Each option has costs, and the problem deserves further attention.
Jazz Maurizzi (Sun,) studied this question.