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Examines the challenge of divine freedom in philosophy of religion, suggesting implications for understanding God’s nature.
Contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, following Plantinga's influential The Nature of Necessity (1974), defines perfect being theology as the maximization of great-making properties. The standard problem of divine foreknowledge concerns human freedom. This paper explores a different problem: divine freedom. If God has infallible knowledge of His own future actions, then those actions are settled in a way that seems to rule out the power to do otherwise. I develop this argument formally, drawing on Plantinga's definitions, and examine three standard responses to the foreknowledge problem, the non-causal defense, Molinism, and the hard/soft fact distinction. None, I argue, succeeds in preserving divine freedom. This leaves a trilemma: deny infallible self-knowledge, deny libertarian divine freedom, or embrace mystery. Each option has costs, and the problem deserves further attention.
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Jazz Maurizzi (2026) studied this question.
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