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The paper reconstructs a conditional argument for God, exploring explanations and agency in metaphysics.
This paper reconstructs an earlier computational proof of God as an auditable conditional argument. Its only positive deductive endpoint is deliberately bounded: P1-P5 conditionally yield a necessary explanatory ground. P6-P8 form an abductive agency extension whose central operation, the A2 metaphysical selector, faces a three-way problem. Necessitating reasons threaten modal collapse; permissive or satisficing reasons preserve alternatives but do not determine why this totality obtains; and primitive non-entailing choice preserves contingency by accepting a residual primitive at the selection point. A finite two-world model exhaustively checks the S5 schema on its frame and enumerates constant and contingency-preserving selection maps. It establishes formal satisfiability only, not metaphysical possibility, explanatory adequacy, agency, or divine existence. The Plantinga-style S5 route is therefore removed from the positive case and retained as a diagnostic appendix: P9-P11 remain independently burdened by modal semantics, positive possibility evidence, and the joint coherence of maximal attributes. Computer-supported analyses of ontological arguments sharpen this boundary by showing that validity, consistency, and modal-collapse behavior depend on the encoded axioms. The result remains a conditional PSR argument with an unresolved abductive agency extension, not a completed proof or a demonstration of classical theism.
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Micah Blumberg (2026) studied this question.
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