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Gödel's ontological proof is a higher-order modal argument from axioms governing positive properties to the necessary existence of a God-like being. In the version developed here, five positivity axioms and three definitions generate four main results: every positive property is possibly instantiated; God-likeness is possibly instantiated; God-likeness is an essence of every God-like individual; and a God-like individual exists necessarily. The same axiom system also yields modal collapse, while a one-world, one-individual model shows that the five positivity axioms are jointly satisfiable. We then define a semantic completion that begins from the completed modal derivation. We supply an ambient semantics in which self-reference, contradiction, fixed points, restriction, and return are represented explicitly. Belnap--Dunn four-valued semantics provides an ambient carrier FOUR=,T,F,B\ containing the Boolean core Bool=,T\ as a proper substructure. Negation fixes N and B; the information-closing map $Inc(v)=B$ has the unique fixed point B; every Boolean endomap transported through the inclusion lands in ,T\ while ambient closure lands at B; contradiction remains localized as designated information; and a provenance-enriched split--fuse pair satisfies the exact return law μ∘δ=id, with ρ=δ∘μ idempotently normalizing modal provenance. The completed architecture therefore has three distinct closures. The modal proof closes into necessity. The paraconsistent semantics closes into the ambient fixed point B. The return structure closes differentiation by exact recovery. Together these three formally distinct layers give a complete account of necessary existence, self-referential closure, and return.
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Christopher Mills (2026) studied this question.
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