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Papers in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

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  1. Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: A Parameterized Algorithm for Optimal Stable MatchingsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  2. Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison RuleACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  3. Interval Scheduling Games with Color-Based Concurrent JobsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  4. Polyhedral Clinching Auctions with a Single SampleACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  5. On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist RulesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  6. On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist RulesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  7. College Applications with Non-Homogeneous Application CostsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  8. Discrete Single-Parameter Optimal Auction DesignACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  9. Price of Anarchy in Paving Matroid Congestion GamesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  10. Structural and Algorithmic Results for Stable Cycles and Partitions in the Roommates ProblemACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  11. α-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain UtilitiesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2026
  12. The Role of Social Support and Influencers in Content MarketsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  13. Market Design for Capacity Sharing in NetworksACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  14. Non-uniformly Stable MatchingsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  15. Asynchronous Majority Dynamics on Binomial Random GraphsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  16. Prophet Inequalities over TimeACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  17. Leveraging Optimal Transport to Design Optimal Mechanisms for the Facility Location ProblemACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  18. Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral TradeACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  19. Faster Dynamic Auctions via Polymatroid SumACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  20. A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank ValuationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  21. An Ascending Polynomial Running Time Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of an Integer PolymatroidACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  22. Maximin Shares in Hereditary Set SystemsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  23. Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible AgentsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  24. Truthful Allocation in Graphs and HypergraphsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  25. Prophet Inequalities via the Expected Competitive RatioACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  26. Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition FormationACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  27. Estimating Policy Functions in Payment Systems Using Reinforcement LearningACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  28. Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under CompetitionACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2025
  29. Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible GoodsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  30. Computational Complexity of k -stable MatchingsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  31. On Hill’s Worst-Case Guarantee for Indivisible BadsENLIGHTEN (Jurnal Bimbingan dan Konseling Islam) · 2024
  32. Algorithmic Persuasion with EvidenceACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  33. Search Steering in Two-Sided PlatformsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  34. The Price of Justified RepresentationACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  35. Deterministic Impartial Selection with WeightsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  36. Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items RevisitedACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  37. Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in network congestion games: the impact of symmetry and network structureACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  38. Convexity in Real-time Bidding and Related ProblemsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  39. Matching Tasks and Workers under Known Arrival Distributions: Online Task Assignment with Two-sided ArrivalsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  40. Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized MechanismsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  41. Blockchain-based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The Case of Mining PoolsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2024
  42. Price of Anarchy in Algorithmic Matching of Romantic PartnersACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  43. Topological Bounds on the Price of Anarchy of Clustering Games on NetworksACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  44. Social Cost Analysis of Shared/Buy-in Computing SystemsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  45. Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via CopiesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  46. An Auction Algorithm for Market Equilibrium with Weak Gross Substitute DemandsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  47. Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and AugmentationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  48. A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution ConceptsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  49. Reaching Individually Stable Coalition StructuresACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023
  50. Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: A Mechanism to Destabilize Inefficient Locked-in TechnologiesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2023