Paraconsistent logics, minimally, are not explosive; that is, on these logics, not everything follows from a contradiction of the form ‘A and not-A’. Dialetheists, who argue that some contradictions are true (Priest 2006), have philosophically interpreted such logics as supporting the existence of true contradictions, since they allow for the possibility of true contradictions without triviality. In this paper, I provide basic criteria for philosophical interpretations of logics and consider the costs of violating such criteria, especially by engaging in logical overinterpretation. I argue that overinterpretation supports metaphysical or epistemological readings of logics that are not called for and that can be resisted on philosophically independent grounds. A more neutral, modalist-empiricist stance toward logics in general, and of paraconsistent logics in particular, is then advanced.
Otávio Bueno (Thu,) studied this question.