Analysis shows how geopolitics drives global value chains in the context of US–China technological rivalry.
Since the Covid-19 pandemic and the heightening of US–China tensions, Global Value Chain (GVC) and Global Production Network (GPN) research has begun to pay more attention to geopolitics. This article argues however, that far from representing a recent phenomenon, geopolitics has underpinned the formation and expansion of GVCs and GPNs. Early GVC and GPN 2.0 literatures did not integrate geopolitical considerations into their conceptual frameworks. To remedy this gap, this article advances the notion of the imperialist chain as a key element in the emergence and expansion of GVCs/GPNs. The notion denotes a structured although contested hierarchy of political-economic formations—entailing hegemonic and counter-hegemonic alliances—where leading states employ geopolitics to maintain their and their firms’ prime positions. China’s catch-up development challenges this structured hierarchy. This article focusses upon the US’s attainment and attempts to maintain its dominant position within the imperialist chain (and of US-firms in GVCs) through control over core technologies. It shows how (a) geopolitical concerns were central to early investments in core technologies by the US and more recently by China, (b) such investments contributed to enabling US firms to attain lead firm status in many GVCs/GPNs, and (c) geopolitical relations underpin contemporary attempts by the US state to repress Chinese technological development.
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Selwyn et al. (2025) studied this question.
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