Nefarious Algorithms: Rent-Fixing via Algorithmic Collusion and the Role of Intentionality in the Pursuit of Class Monopoly Rent

Housing unaffordability and widening socio-spatial polarization continue to pervade US cities today. Driving this phenomenon, in part, is the increasing investment of rental housing stock by corporate landowners who rely on firms like RealPage, Inc. to employ advanced algorithms that determine the highest possible rent to charge tenants. RealPage is currently being sued for violating US antitrust law. This study critically examines the evidence against and in defense of RealPage to identify the firm’s practices as a technologically advanced strategy of pursuing class monopoly rent (CMR). In the process, the study brings scholarship on platform real estate into closer dialogue with land rent theory and criticism of existing antitrust law in the US to establish a more nuanced understanding of intentionality. We argue that the treatment of intentionality by the existing legal framework is limited in terms of recognizing the myriad ways in which CMR is realized in the rental housing sector, especially in contexts where CMR is realized without entailing explicit collusive intent among the market players. Our analysis also reveals that RealPage’s algorithmically enabled pursuit of CMR potentially widens the scale of impact across submarket boundaries that might not have otherwise been possible, exacerbating existing and entrenched patterns of socio-economic segregation and socio-spatial inequality. We conclude by discussing the implications of the study’s findings for policy with an emphasis on the kinds of policies intended (or designed) to suppress the pursuit of CMR in the first place.