The scientific article presents a comprehensive theoretical and legal study of the right to be forgotten as a new institution of digital human rights, which is being formed in the conditions of intensive information transformation of society. It is established that digital rights in general and the right to be forgotten in particular do not have a well-established normative definition in Ukrainian legislation, which causes fragmentation of doctrinal approaches and complicates the formation of a holistic policy for the protection of the individual in the digital environment. It is substantiated that, given their interdisciplinary nature, these rights are not subject to traditional classification within the framework of human rights but correspond to the essence of the fifth generation of rights - those aimed at protecting dignity, privacy, reputation and information autonomy in the conditions of a globalized digital space. The study focuses on the legal nature, structure and functional burden of the right to be forgotten. It is emphasized that this right cannot be reduced to a technical operation to erase personal data. It is a broader legal phenomenon that encompasses the ability of a person to control his or her own digital identity, limit the reproduction of irrelevant or excessive information, and to seek the removal of links from search engine results. Its normative evolution is revealed - from the provisions of the 1981 Council of Europe Convention to the practice of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Google Spain case (2014) and incorporation into Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The issue of the lack of normative certainty is raised, and the need for its autonomous regulation beyond the limits of a purely personalized approach to data processing is indicated. A range of key doctrinal approaches to understanding the right to be forgotten is outlined, the positions of V. Mayer-Schonberger, L. Floridi, M. Allegri, who offer different philosophical, ethical and legal approaches to interpreting this phenomenon. The importance of differentiating between the right to privacy, dignity and the right to data confidentiality is emphasized. Attention is drawn to the tension between this right and freedom of expression, which requires constant balancing in the light of the principle of proportionality. The ethical criticism of the institution regarding the risk of turning it into a tool of digital censorship is considered. At the same time, it is shown that the right to be forgotten enjoys public support as a means of restoring the information balance in conditions of growing digital openness. It is summarized that the right to be forgotten should be normatively distinguished as an independent legal institution in the system of digital human rights. The feasibility of its institutionalization as part of the fifth generation of human rights, focused on a new model of interaction between the individual, the state and the digital environment, is argued. It is emphasized that the effective implementation of this right is impossible without clear procedural guarantees, institutional maturity of mechanisms for balancing private and public interests, and normative specification of the boundaries and grounds for its application.
V. Prodan (Mon,) studied this question.