Moderate Pluralism in Contemporary Philosophy of Science

The article proposes and substantiates the initial outlines the concept of moderate pluralism for contemporary philosophy of science. In the context of methodological and conceptual diversity in modern science, philosophy is faced with the need to develop epistemological approaches that can account for both the normative authority of scientific knowledge and the plurality of its forms. Moderate pluralism can serve as both a heuristic and normative methodology that helps to overcome the tension between dogmatism – resulting from a tendency toward unification – and radical relativism, which often leads to methodological arbitrariness. Based on a critique of reductionist and universalist models, the author analyzes the genesis and key principles of Sandra Mitchell’s integrative pluralism, and proposes to distinguish moderate pluralism (by analogy with moderate rationalism) as an epistemologically oriented methodology. The article examines examples of successful application of pluralist strategies in various scientific disciplines (biology, social sciences, climatology), as well as its critique. Moderate pluralism is presented as a philosophical tool capable of integrating diverse forms of knowledge without compromising critical rigor, striking a balance between normative and descriptive approaches to the conceptualization of scientific progress.