Crisis management and institutional transformation: How China’s Communist Party ensured survival through military modernization, 1976–1992

Type of the article: Reflexive Preface AbstractThe survival of authoritarian institutions during periods of systemic crisis represents a critical challenge in understanding institutional transformation and organizational resilience. This theoretical paper aims to develop a critical realist framework for analyzing how institutions ensure survival through crisis learning processes during periods of systemic transformation. The theoretical basis draws on critical realism and the morphogenetic approach to theorize structure-agency interactions during critical junctures, introducing concepts of crisis learning cycles, systemic persistence, and facing/reacting mechanisms. Following an innovative theory of systemic persistence, the analysis centers on the ways in which the Communist Party of China ensured its own survival through successive rounds of crisis learning. The results demonstrate that military modernization, not economic development per se, constituted the central organizing principle of institutional transformation. The study reveals that economic reforms and the opening up of trade were components of a larger arrangement constructed by Deng Xiaoping, the primary focus of which was not benefiting the Chinese people, but another project essential to the Communist Party. The theoretical results demonstrate that crisis learning occurs through iterative cycles where agents progressively understand systemic elements and construct durable solutions. The framework offers practical value for understanding institutional transformation processes and organizational survival strategies during periods of fundamental change, with applications extending beyond authoritarian contexts to any institution facing an existential crisis.