Is the Mind Ever Constituted by Bodily Processes Outside the Brain? Exploring Embodied Cognition

In this essay I explore whether the mind is ever constituted by processes that are not in the brain. I interrogate whether the processes of remembering when typing words on a keyboard are all processes done by the brain, suggesting that perhaps the hands do some of the remembering themselves. We typically think of remembering as a minded activity, and therefore it would seem that the processes the hands are carrying out are minded processes. I outline both embodied and representationalist accounts of mind and suggest that a classical representationalist account of the activity of typing words on a keyboard is not the most satisfying or comprehensive explanation of what is going on. My argument is supported by an argument from enculturation that developments in our environments have facilitated developments in our cognition that means the brain is not the sole cognitive part of the body. I ultimately conclude that there is a strong case for embodied cognition being included as a form of cognition and therefore in some ways constituting the mind.