Well-Being and the Confucian Spiritual Ideal of Joy

A survey of the existing literature shows that there is limited philosophical inquiry into the construct of well-being, particularly from East Asian spiritual traditions. This article reconceptualises well-being by critiquing the prevailing constructs of well-being, and proposing an alternative formulation from Confucian philosophy. I argue that the dominant categorisation of well-being into hedonic and eudaimonic has engendered two major weaknesses. First, the emphasis on positive emotions in hedonic well-being privileges individualism and self-interest, catalysed by the positive psychology movement. Secondly, there is a lack of clarity on the role of emotions and the place of virtues in self-actualisation for eudaimonic well-being. I then sketch a Confucian interpretation of well-being by drawing on Mencius’ spiritual ideal of joy. My argument is that Mencian well-being revolves around virtue-directed joy, which is experienced through the extension of innate moral feelings. Instead of an artificial dichotomy of well-being into hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, Mencius harmonises both by acknowledging both positive emotions and self-actualisation. Confucian spiritual perspectives extend the existing scholarship by providing an original interpretation of well-being that foregrounds the primary role of emotions in character development. Confucian spiritual perspectives extend the existing scholarship on well-being by foregrounding collective well-being, and highlighting the contribution of emotional experience to the cultivation of ethical character.