On High-Value Mixed Cropping System: Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of HMC Synergy of Circular and Sharing Economy for Multiple Low-to-Middle-Income Farmer Families

This paper introduces a novel four-party evolutionary game model to analyze cooperation dynamics in High-Value Mixed Cropping (HMC) systems integrating non-pesticide cacao, cashew nut, and free-range chicken farming within circular and sharing economy frameworks. The model uniquely examines strategic interactions among local government and three farming family types (cacao, cashew, and chicken), incorporating both regulatory mechanisms and cooperative behaviors. Through rigorous stability analysis and MATLAB simulations based on empirical data from Southeast Vietnam, we identify precise conditions for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) that sustain long-term cooperation. Our results demonstrate that government incentives (subsidies, technical support) and reputational sanctions critically shape farmers’ and consumers’ payoffs, thereby steering the system toward collective action equilibria. In particular, increasing the strength of positive incentives or reputational benefits enlarges the basin of attraction for full-cooperation ESSs, regardless of initial strategy distributions. Conversely, overly punitive sanctions can destabilize collaborative outcomes. These findings underscore the pivotal role of well-balanced policy instruments in fostering resilience, innovation, and resource circulation within rural agroecosystems. Finally, we propose targeted policy recommendations, such as graduated subsidy schemes, participatory monitoring platforms, and cooperative branding initiatives, to reinforce circular economy practices and accelerate progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.