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Analysis reveals the dilemmas directors face under corporate laws, suggesting potential interventions for climate strategies.
The EU’s recent legislations on corporate sustainability have reignited the debates about the roles and duties of directors in addressing climate change, mainly due to the obligation on climate transition plans outlined under Article 22 of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). However, defining the directors’ role in this regard remains a challenging task due to the silence of the European legislation regarding directors. Moreover, the tensions between the obligations under the EU legislation on climate, national corporate laws that strongly emphasize corporate interest, and corporate dynamics that often grant shareholders a dominant position, create a web of conflicting dilemmas. As a result, directors are caught in a love triangle of competing shareholder, corporate, and climate-related interests. These dilemmas can further lead to risks for liability if directors want to go beyond mere legal compliance and seek ambitious climate strategies. Against this background, this paper aims to answer two interconnected questions: (1) What dilemmas could directors face in the climate transition processes? (2) What intervention scenarios targeting directors and shareholders could enable more ambitious climate strategies? While this paper primarily draws on Dutch corporate law as a point of departure for a more concrete examination, its findings may offer broader insights as comparison allows.
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Irem Akin (2025) studied this question.
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